Oregon elections officials regularly communicate and share information among each other and other local, state, and federal partners to keep voter rolls clean. The Secretary of State's Elections Division regularly updates voter registration lists to remove deceased people, people who have moved, and other changes that impact eligibility. This happens on an ongoing basis, year-round, to ensure that when we mail ballots, they go to an accurate list.

This information sharing includes:

• The Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), a national data system that ensures up-to-date voter registration information is shared across states.
• The National Change of Address program, which provides a secure dataset of individuals and families that have filed a change-of-address with the U.S. Postal Service.
• The Oregon Health Authority Vital Records Division, which has information regarding the deaths of Oregonians. Local elections officials also receive information from obituaries and other reliable community sources.
• The Oregon Driver and Motor Vehicles division through Oregon Motor Voter, which automatically registers voters and updates voter registration information whenever there's a qualifying interaction with the DMV.

There are other preventative measures in place to ensure only living, eligible voters cast a ballot.

If someone falsely casts a deceased voter’s ballot, for instance, it would be removed because the signature wouldn’t pass a signature matching review against the signature on file. In addition, if a person tries to cast a ballot for a deceased voter, they could face felony charges. It is a felony offense to vote for someone else.

​​​​​​​​No. Oregon elections are secure and protected against voter fraud in all but exceedingly rare instances. 

A review of the vote by mail system​ by the state’s Legislative Fiscal Office found from 2000-2019 there were approximately 61 million ballots cast. Of those, 38 criminal convictions of voter fraud were obtained. This amounts to a .00006% rate. ​

​​​Many counties no longer use secrecy sleeves and have been approved to switch to another secure method by the Secretary of State and as allowed by law. We still ensure that your ballot is secret with a return envelope that has a security weave printed inside, preventing information on the ballot from being visible to anyone while the envelope is in transit.

Every county in Oregon has procedures in place to ensure that authorized election staff, working in bipartisa​n teams, cannot see voters’ identifying information while opening return envelopes and separating the ballots. Each county has a specific workflow in place tailored to their building, equipment, and number of ballots typically returned.

The ballots — which contain no voter specific identifying information — are tabulated only after they are separated from the return envelopes.

These procedures ensure that your ballot is secret.

​​​​​​​In partnership with The News Literacy Project, The Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Arizona State University, and Stony Brook University School of Journalism, Facebook released the below tips on how to spot false news online: 

1. Be skeptical of headlines. False news stories often have catchy headlines in all caps with exclamation points. If shocking claims in the headline sound unbelievable, they probably are.
2. Look closely at the link. A phony or look-alike link may be a warning sign of false news. Many false news sites mimic authentic news sources by making small changes to the link. You can go to the site to compare the link to established sources.
3. Investigate the source. Ensure that the story is written by a source that you trust with a reputation for accuracy. If the story comes from an unfamiliar organization, check their "About" section to learn more.
4. Watch for unusual formatting. Many false news sites have misspellings or awkward layouts. Read carefully if you see these signs. Consider the photos. False news stories often contain manipulated images or videos. Sometimes the photo may be authentic, but taken out of context. You can search for the photo or image to verify where it came from. 
5. Inspect the dates. False news stories may contain timelines that make no sense, or event dates that have been altered. Check the evidence. Check the author's sources to confirm that they are accurate. Lack of evidence or reliance on unnamed experts may indicate a false news story.
6. Look at other reports. If no other news source is reporting the same story, it may indicate that the story is false. If the story is reported by multiple sources you trust, it's more likely to be true.
7. Is the story a joke? Sometimes false news stories can be hard to distinguish from humor or satire. Check whether the source is known for parody, and whether the story's details and tone suggest it may be just for fun.
8. Some stories are intentionally false. Think critically about the stories you read, and only share news that you know to be credible. ​

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​​​​We closely monitor our systems for suspicious activity and frequently test for vulnerabilities. Our staff are routinely trained on how to appropriately handle suspicious email and other threats to prevent unauthorized access or tampering. 

More specifically, we have programs, policies, and plans in place to address and mitigate security breaches. ​We work with partners such as: the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) to ensure best practices are used to protect our elections and their supporting systems.​

We practice Def​ense in Depth​ with administrative, technical, and managerial security controls. Layers of security controls provide several ways of monitoring and responding to malicious access attempts to our systems. Any successful access to our system has been reviewed by multiple security checks and verifications.

We routinely perform threat analysis and risk assessments. Assessments are conducted by internal staff as well as contracted third parties. As a result, we continue to improve security processes and protections to maintain secure, private, and accurate election infrastructure.

​Preventative, Detection, and Response Measures

We use preventative, detection, and response measures including:​

Risk and vulnerability management
Network and endpoint security
Continuous monitoring of systems
Incident management and response planning
Routine security training​

Ballots are counted by machines, which are faster and more accurate than hand counts. Several steps are taken to ensure the accuracy of the count. First, the machines are tested and certified three times: well before, just before, and after elections take place. Oregon's machines passed federal lab tested certification and are tailored to Oregon's vote-by-mail system. Second, the machines are never connected to the internet and physical access to the machines is tightly restricted. Finally, Oregon has required post-election audits after each statewide election since 2008. In these audits, elections officials conduct a hand recount to verify that the machine count is accurate.​​

​​​Oregon Secretary of State and Oregon counties use Albert sensors to help protect their networks and improve election security.​​​ 

These sensors are specifically designed for state and local governments. They monitor network traffic and look for matches against known threats. Learn more about Albert sensors and see the agreements used by Oregon below.

About the Albert Sensor

Agreement 1, in use by Oregon State and Counties

​Agreement 2, in use by Oregon State and Counties​